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RECENT DECISIONS

INSURANCE - SUPERVISION BY THE STATE - WHAT CONSTITUTES THE
INSURANCE BusmEss - Plaintiff, a corporation, advertised that any person
who bought goods from certain selected stores would be entitled to receive
coupons, and when his coupons amounted to a certain sum he would be entitled to certain death and security benefits up to specified amounts. Plaintiff
brought suit against the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania to enjoin him
from interfering with the plaintiff's business. Held, that the plaintiff was
carrying on an insurance business and was subject to supervision by the Insurance Commissioner. Hunt v. Puhlic Mutual Benefit Foundation, (C. C. A.
3d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 749, certiorari denied (U. S. 1938) 59 S. Ct. 75.
The transaction in question whereby the holder of a certain number of
coupons became entitled to certain benefits in the event of death or emergency
appears to contain the essential elements of an insurance contract as established
by textwriters 1 and the cases. 2 However, a reasonable inference from the facts
is that the purpose of the undertakings was to stimulate business activity rather
than to enter into insurance contracts. The case thus raises the problem of the
extent to which a person may enter into transactions partaking of the nature
of insurance for the purpose of stimulating other business activity in which he is
primarily engaged, without complying with the statutes regulating the insurance
business. It is well established that the insurance business is affected with the
public interest,8 and subject to regulation for the purpose of protecting policy

1 VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 2 (1930), where the essential elements of a
contract of insurance are enumerated as follows: (1) insurable interest in the insured;
(2) insured subject to risk of loss through destruction or impairment of that interest
by the happening of designated perils; (3) assumption of that risk by the insurer;
(4) the assumption being part of a general risk distributing scheme; (5) consideration
for the insurer's promise in the form of a ratable contribution called a premium.
2 "An insurance contract is one whereby, for a stipulated consideration, one party
undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a specified subject by specified perils."
Stockbridge, J., in Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Oliner, 139 Md. 408 at 410, II5
A. 592 (1921). See People ex rel. Kasson v. Rose, 174 Ill. 310, 51 N. E. 246
(1898), in which many definitions to the same effect are gathered.
8 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612 (1913).
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holders.4 Subject to carrying out the purposes of the regulation, a reasonable
latitude should be permitted business men in the use of promotional devices to
increase sales and stimulate business activity. In recognition of this need are the
cases holding that warranty undertakings in connection with the sale of goods,
whereby the vendor undertakes to pay a sum of money or do some other act
if the product is not as warranted, do not constitute insurance. 5 Similarly, if
there is no hazard or peril, as is usually contemplated in definitions of insurance, 6 but a mere contract entitling certificate holders to services or goods at
reduced prices,7 or to a return upon an investment accumulated by the monthly
payment of small sums, 8 the contract is not one of insurance. An incidental
provision in a contract made in furtherance of the primary business activity
of one of the parties by which, in the event of certain contingencies, an added
benefit will accrue to the other party, does not constitute it an insurance contract
subject to statutory regulation. 9 The freedom with which such collateral undertakings may be employed is restricted by the disposition of the courts to look
through any subterfuge under which an actual insurance business is being carried on, and by their desire to protect against fraud and overreaching.10 Where
4
Hartford Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 256 Ky. 338 at 344, 76 S. W. (2d)
17 (1935), in which the court said: "The business of insurance so affects public
welfare as to be a proper subject for reasonable regulation by the state through the
elimination of ingenious and ambiguous provisions and the avoidance of disadvantages
from which policy holders might suffer grievous injustice."
6
Cole v. Haven, (Iowa, 1880) 7 N. W. 383 (agreement by vendor of lightning
rods to pay all damages to buildings occasioned by lightning held not insurance) ;
Evans & Tate v. Premier Refining Co., 31 Ga. App. 303, 120 S. E. 553 (1933)
(agreement by seller of oil to replace gears in automobiles of customers if they wore
out while using his oil, held not insurance).
6 See notes I and 2, supra.
7
State ex rel. Fishback v. Universal Service Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151 P. 768
(1915).
8 State ex rel. Clapp v. Federal Investment Co., 48 Minn. I 10, 50 N. W. 1028
(1892).
9 Stem v. Rosenthal, 71 Misc. 422, 128 N. Y. S; 7II (19II) (employment of
plaintiff to manufacture trousers out of defendant's materials, the defendant agreeing
in consideration of deduction of I o/o from the amount to become due to pay for
plaintiff's services even though goods should be damaged by fire); Hansen v. Dodwell
Dock & Warehouse Co., 100 Wash. 46, 170 P. 346 (1918) (employer's agreement
to protect employees from interference and violence from strikers); James Eva
Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 P. 415 (1919) (guaranty by brewing
company of lease of customer); Colaizzi v. Pennsylvania Ry., 208 N. Y. 275, IOI
N. E. 859 (1913) (railroad managed relief fund to which both employer and employees contributed and out of which accident and sickness benefits were paid to employees; held not insurance) •
10 Where undertakers formed burial associations whose members paid annual dues
and upon death were entitled to burial, the courts have generally held such transactions to be insurance. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Witchita Mut. Burial Assn., 73 Kan.
179, 84 P. 757 (1906); Renschler v. State ex rel. Hogan, 90 Ohio St. 363, 107 N. E.
758 (1914); Oklahoma S. W. Burial Assn. v. State, 135 Okla. 151, 274 P. 642
(1928). In State v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296 at 304, 86 N. E. 68 (1908), the conrt
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a contract creditor agrees to cancel the balance owing upon the contract in the
event of the debtor's death before maturity of the debt, the transaction has commonly been held to be insurance.11 Such cases may be regarded as close, the
obvious purpose of the insurance feature being to stimulate business; but where,
in such a transaction, the debtor makes a covenant of good health, or agrees to
submit to a medical examination, the holding that the creditor is carrying on
a life insurance business seems justified.12 Similarly, where the promisor obligates himself to purchase some interest of the promisee, and it is reasonable
to suppose that the option will not be exercised unless future contingencies subject the promisee to risk of loss, the transaction is held to be insurance.13 Some
of the confusion existing in the cases arises out of the tendency of the courts
to call a contract of insurance not insurance if there is no basis for regulation.
Thus a transaction partaking of the nature of insurance may not be subject
to regulation because it is a single transaction and not a course of business/'
or because not entered into for profit.15 Security to policy holders would appear
to be afforded by regulation looking toward elimination of dishonest practices and
the risk of insolvency of the insurer.16 In view of these requirements, it is
said, "Some of the provisions are unreasonable, some unguarded, and others indefinite,
and tend to expose the concern to the suspicion that the whole system is, in real
design, but the scheme of an undertaker to promote his private business, largely at the
expense of persons of small means. A wise public policy demands that the laws be
liberally construed to circumvent any attempt, by such bodies, to evade the reasonable
and beneficient restraints of the statute."
11
Attorney General ex rel. Monk v. C. E. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144
N. E. 371 (1924); United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Bond, 16 App. D. C.
579 (1900); State v. Beardsley, 88 Minn. 20, 92 N. W. 472 (1902).
12
Saltzman v. Fairbank Realty Corp., 144 Misc. 243, 257 N. Y. S. 575 (1932);
Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, (C. C. A. 8th, 1896) 77 F. 32.
18 In re Hogan, 8 N. D. 301, 78 N. W. 1051 (1899) (contract whereby a
farmer acquired option to sell crops at a specified figure per acre); Commonwealth
ex rel. Schnader v. Fidelity Land Value Assurance Co., 312 Pa. 425, 167 A. 300
( 193 3) ( corporation contracted, in consideration of premium paid by land developer, to
issue to purchasers of lots bonds to repurchase at a certain price after given period);
Claflin v. United States Credit System Co., 165 Mass. 501, 43 N. E. 293 (1896)
(contract to purchase at a fixed figure accounts which during a stated period should be
unpaid and owing the promisee).
14 James Eva Estate v. Mecca Co., 40 Cal. App. 515, 181 P. 415 (1919)
(guaranty by brewing company of lease of a customer); Calumet & Hecla Mining Co.
v. Stafford, (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1919) 179 N. Y. S. 672 (agreement by defendant to
procure war risk insurance for plaintiff who had engaged cargo space on defendant's
ship).
16 State v. Taylor, 56 N. J. L. 49, 27 A. 797 (1893); Cowan v. New York
Caledonian Club, 46 App. Div. 288, 61 N. Y. S. 714 (1899). In these cases it was
held that where in respect to funeral benefits the scheme of the society or association
was purely charitable, from which it derived no pecuniary benefits, it was not subject to the insurance laws.
16 In Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 164 Pa. 306, 30 A. 217 (1894), the court
said that security to policy holders required, through regulation, (I) permanence
in the custodian of the funds, (2) honest and competent administration of these
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argua~le that there is no need for regulation where the indemnity is in the
form of cancellation of an obligation.17 But where the purchaser of goods is
led to believe he thereby becomes entitled to certain insurance benefits, as in the
principal case, it may be assumed that the consideration for the insurance is part
of the purchase price of the goods, and a valid basis for regulation exists in the
prevention of fraud and misrepresentation.
Thomas E. Wilson

funds, (3) restraint against the division of the profits of the business whenever such
division would injuriously affect the security of the policy holders.
17 24 CoL. L. REv. 802 (1924).

